报告信息
物流管理系2019年10月Workshop
主持人：杨晓东 博士 上海对外经贸大学上海对外经贸大学物流管理系
时 间：2019年10月12日（星期六）9:00-11:00
地 点：上海对外经贸大学信息楼336室
主 办：上海对外经贸大学上海对外经贸大学物流管理系
主题
Partial Centralization in Competing Supply Chains
(竞争供应链中的局部中心化)
主讲人：施春明 教授 加拿大罗瑞尔大学商业与经济学院
主讲人简介
施春明教授2007年在Washington State University获得博士学位，同年进入Wilfrid Laurier University任教，研究的主要领域是供应链管理，可持续性，运营与会计交叉研究。他的研究成果发表在European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of the Operational Research Society, International Journal of Production Economics, Omega, and IEEE Transactions on System, Man and Cybernetics等知名国际学术期刊上。
报告简介
A great amount of research has been done on whether a supply chain should be complete centralized or complete decentralized. With a completely centralized supply chain, a manufacturer can sell directly to the consumers or fully own the downstream retailer. With a completely decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer and the downstream retailer make decisions to optimize their own interests. However, complete centralization or complete decentralization may be inconsistent with the common business practice of partial centralization (PC) among firms. That is, a firm may own only a part of another firm within the same supply chain. In this paper, we make an important contribution by studying PC in two competing supply chains each with a manufacturer and a retailer. Our analyses and results show that for the competing manufacturers and their supply chains, PC can always lead to higher profits than complete centralization regardless of the level of product substitutability. Furthermore, PC can lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and their supply chains than complete decentralization except when competing are close to perfect substitutes. Therefore, this research offers an important explanation of the widespread business phenomenon of partial centralization in supply chains.
主题2
Carrot or Stick? An Analysis of Environmental Policies in Supply Chains
(“胡萝卜”还是“大棒”？供应链环境政策分析)
主讲人：卞俊松教授 澳大利亚悉尼麦格理大学麦格理商学院
主讲人简介
卞俊松博士于2013 年获得香港城市大学和中国科技大学管理科学博士学位。他是澳大利亚悉尼麦格理大学麦格理商学院的终身教授。在担任现职之前，卞博士曾在澳大利亚皇家墨尔本理工大学、加拿大威尔弗里德·劳瑞尔大学和温莎大学工作。他的研究兴趣包括运营和供应链管理、定量营销和产业经济学。通过使用各种研究方法，如博弈论和统计学，他的研究成果发表在《运输研究E：物流和运输评论》、《国际生产经济学杂志》和《运营研究年鉴》等期刊上。
报告简介
This study investigates the impact of two environmental policies: emissions abatement subsidy and emissions tax, on a three-tier supply chain where the manufacturer distributes through competitive retailers and invests in emissions abatement manufacturing technology. The government pursues social welfare maximization, while the manufacturer and retailers are profit driven. We find that the subsidy policy offers the manufacturer greater incentives to abate pollution and yields higher profits for channel members; however, when emissions abatement is very costly and production emissions are highly damaging, the tax policy should be implemented, as the subsidy policy leads to lower social welfare and environmental performance. Interestingly, we show that the manufacturer has no incentive to improve emissions abatement efficiency if the environmental damage of its production is high under the subsidy policy or low under the tax policy. The manufacturer always welcomes more downstream entry under the subsidy policy but not necessarily under the tax policy; each retailer always fares worse with more competition. More competition enhances social welfare under the tax policy but not necessarily under the subsidy policy. Furthermore, caution should be exercised when adopting the subsidy policy, because a “hazard zone” exists where society suffers but does not under the tax policy.